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Household indebtedness in Chile has received considerable 
attention in recent years because of the financial deepening process 
underway in the economy. Although various macroeconomic 
indicators show significant increases in the last decade, there are 
few tools for evaluating the real vulnerability of this sector from a 
financial stability perspective. One of these tools is stress testing 
using microeconomic information.
Although households may face a variety of financial risks from a 
range of sources, the household sector is most sensitive to changes in 
household income, such as those caused by unemployment (Debelle, 
2004a, 2004b). Moreover, household vulnerability to aggregate shocks 
that raise the unemployment rate will depend on both debt distribution 
and household characteristics. The heterogeneity of indebtedness 
levels and income uncertainty calls for microeconomic analysis.
The main objective of this paper is to carry out a household stress 
test at the microeconomic level that allows quantifying household 
debt at risk when facing aggregate shocks. Evidence from debt 
issuers indicates that the main reason for households to default is 
unemployment, so we focus on labor income risk associated with the 
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probability of job loss when the aggregate unemployment rate shifts. 
For this purpose, we use panel data survival analysis to estimate 
the probability of job loss at the individual level. We then run Monte 
Carlo simulations to assess household financial stress by estimating 
aggregate debt at risk under high unemployment rate scenarios.
Financial data at the household level are scarce, which is one of 
the reasons why there are so few household-level studies assessing 
household financial indebtedness. The recent Chilean Household 
Financial Survey (EFH) carried out by the Central Bank of Chile 
contributes novel information for this type of analysis.
Nordic countries have been leading this sort of analysis The 
Swedish Central Bank has published a series of simulations based 
on microeconomic data.1 They find that Swedish households are not 
particularly vulnerable to shifts in interest rates or unemployment 
rates. Specifically, 6.3 percent of households have what they call a 
negative margin, accounting for 5.6 percent of total household debt (debt 
at risk). Unemployment rate increases of 1–3 percentage points cause 
the share of households without a margin to rise to 6.7 percent and 
debt at risk to 6.3 percent. Vatne (2006) carries out a similar exercise, 
finding that 19 percent of households have a negative margin and that 
they account for 16 percent of total debt. The study concludes that low 
and median income groups hold the majority of the exposed debt and 
have increased their share over time.
Neither study, however, takes into account that aggregate 
unemployment does not have a uniform impact on agents across 
households. In fact, they consider that the probability of falling 
into unemployment is uniform for all workers. This is a very 
strong assumption and can bias the results depending on the 
distribution of debt among individuals. In Chile, there is evidence 
that unemployment is less frequent within high education groups 
and among middle-aged workers (Neilson and Ruiz-Tagle, 2007), 
supporting heterogeneous responses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
analyses the distribution of household indebtedness in Chile and 
discusses debt at risk using data from the 2007 Household Financial 
Survey. Section 2 estimates job loss probabilities based on data from 
the Social Protection Survey Panel, covering a ten-year period from 
1995 to 2004. Nonparametric and semiparametric methods are used to 
1. See Johansson and Persson (2006) and Gyntelberg, Johansson, and Persson 
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estimate the impact of aggregate unemployment rates on individual job 
loss probabilities. Section 3 carries out simulations of debt at risk under 
different scenarios. For this purpose, job loss probabilities are imputed 
into the EFH data, and then Monte Carlo simulations are run to assess 
the distribution of the stress test. Finally, section 4 concludes.
1. householD inDebTeDness anD DebT aT Risk
Household borrowing has grown considerably in Chile, both 
in absolute terms and relative to household income. In fact, the 
growth rate of debt has consistently surpassed that of real GDP 
over the last decades. This has raised concerns about the household 
sector’s vulnerability and possible implications for the stability of 
the financial system. Households’ ability to pay back debts and the 
amount of debt they hold determine how much of this debt could be 
considered at risk of not being recovered by credit issuers.
Bank debt represents more than 70 percent of total household 
debt (see figure 1) and grew almost 15 percent, on average, in real 
annual terms between 2003 and 2008. Real bank debt thus almost 
doubled during this period, while real GDP increased almost 30 
percent. Moreover, the growth of total household debt surpassed 
the growth of households’ disposable income, causing the debt-to-
disposable-income ratio to grow significantly over the last several 
years. In the fourth quarter of 2008, this aggregate indicator 
reached almost 69 percent, from 44 percent in the fourth quarter 
of 2003. Furthermore, the ratio of the household financial burden 
to disposable income also expanded, rising from 14 percent to 20 
percent in the same period (figure 1).
Since bank debt is by far the most important household debt, 
the financial system’s exposure to the household sector is a matter 
of concern from a financial stability perspective. Bank exposure, 
measured as the share of total mortgage and consumer loans in total 
bank loans, increased from 15 percent at the beginning of the 1990s 
to more than 33 percent in 2008.
Although Chilean households are increasing their debt, the 
trend in Chile is not significantly different from other countries. 
In fact, the relationship between household debt to GDP and per 
capita GDP suggests that household debt is not a significant share of 
GDP. Nevertheless, the financial-burden-to-disposable-income ratio 
is not particularly low given the country’s economic development, 
measured as per capita GDP (see figure 2). This last observation 302 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
Figure 1. Chilean Household Indebtedness at the 
Macroeconomic Level 
A. Household debt as a percent of GDP
B. Debt-to-income ratio (DTI) 
and debt-service-to-income ratio (DSR)
 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
is related to the length of the loans and the high interest rates, 
relative to developed economies.2
Microeconomic analysis reveals an important heterogeneity 
among Chilean households. In particular, the vast majority of debt 
is held by high-income groups. This is particularly important in 
2. There is a caveat about the financial burden. In some countries, debt service 
refers only to interest payments, while others (including Chile) define it to include both 
interest and principal payments.303 Household Financial Vulnerability
Chile because of the high levels of income inequality. In fact, debt 
distribution maps rather well with income distribution.
Different microeconomic surveys find a similar pattern, though it 
may be changing slightly over time, suggesting a financial deepening 
process (see figure 3; see also figure A1 in the appendix). Moreover, 
households’ behavior in terms of their ability to pay back debts may 
vary considerably depending on their debt and income levels. This 
is an important reason to consider household heterogeneity when 
analyzing household financial vulnerability.
Figure 2. Household Debt: International Comparison
A. Household debt and economic developmenta
B. DSR and household debt
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2006.
a. The countries inside the circle are Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela.304 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
Figure 3. Chilean Household Indebtedness at the 
Microeconomic Level 
A. Distribution of debt by income quintile: 2007 EFH
B. DSR by income quintile
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2004 EPS, 2006 CASEN, and 2007 EFH.
In the remainder of this section, we describe our data sets and 
discuss the debt-at-risk methodology used.305 Household Financial Vulnerability
1.1 The Chilean Household Financial Survey 
Assessing household financial vulnerability requires detailed 
financial data at the household level. The recent Chilean Household 
Financial Survey (Encuesta Financiera de Hogares, or EFH), 
contributes with novel information for this type of analysis.
The EFH was conducted by the Central Bank of Chile for the first 
time in 2007. This survey includes detailed questions about labor 
status, real estate ownership, financial assets, debt, perceptions 
of debt service, access to credit, pensions, insurance, and savings. 
The 2007 EFH covered 4,021 households and was representative at 
the national urban level. Furthermore, since a small fraction of the 
population holds a large share of assets, the survey oversampled 
wealthier households. This skew in the sample was possible thanks 
to the collaboration of the Chilean Internal Revenue Service. The 
2007 EFH thus constitutes the only statistical source in Chile that 
provides complete information on household balance sheets and their 
ability to service financial commitments.3
1.2 Debt Distribution and Debt at Risk
There is no common definition of debt at risk. The Central Bank 
of Chile uses a definition based on the ratio of debt service over 
income (that is, the debt service ratio, or DSR).4 Norway and Sweden 
consider negative margins (that is, when total spending exceeds total 
income). They also include liquid and illiquid assets as debt backup. 
For household h, the margin is computed as
Mh = Yh - DSh - Eh,  (1)
where Yh is total household income, DSh is debt service, and Eh is 
total household expenditures. 
In this paper, the baseline scenario of debt at risk is built 
considering two dimensions: a negative financial margin and a high 
DSR. Data collection posses two problems for interpretation. First, 
there is a risk of double counting. For example, clothing expenditures 
could also appear as debt if purchased with a credit card. Second, if 
3. For a description of the 2007 Chilean Household Financial Survey and a 
discussion of the methodology and results, see Central Bank of Chile (2009).
4. See Cox, Parrado, and Ruiz-Tagle (2006).306 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
a significant share of total expenditures is made with credit cards 
(including supermarket expenditures, for example), the DSR indicator 
could actually overestimate the financial stress of the households.
Taking into account these caveats, we build our baseline scenario 
for debt at risk considering both a negative financial margin and a 
high DSR. The negative financial margin is set at 20 percent excess 
expenditure over income, and the DSR is considered high when it 
is above 50 and above 75. Table 2 presents results for the baseline 
scenario of debt at risk based on the debt service ratio and the financial 
margin. The table reveals that 13.6 percent of households exhibit a 
negative margin and a DSR larger than 50 percent, accounting for 20 
percent of total debt. A more refined assessment of debt at risk, with 
the DSR above 75 percent, indicates that 9.5 percent of households 
are highly financial stressed and 16 percent of total debt is at risk (15 
percent of secured debt and 19 percent of unsecured debt).
2. assessing finanCial vulneRabiliTy
Household financial vulnerability in Chile is mainly due to income 
sources, since only a negligible share of household debt has a variable 
interest rate. Households’ main income source is the labor income 
of their members.5 Labor income can be lost if the job ends for any 
reason, whether voluntary or involuntary. At any time, workers face 
a given probability of losing their jobs. By imputing these job loss 
probabilities to working individuals, we can assess their financial 
vulnerability, provided the financial information is available. However, 
there are no available estimates of job loss probabilities in Chile.6 
This section therefore provides estimates of job loss probabilities 
based on survival analysis using nonparametric and semiparametric 
methods. In particular, the interest is focused on the effect of aggregate 
unemployment rate on job loss probabilities.
The effects of aggregate unemployment are heterogeneous in both a 
static and dynamic framework. Given that the distribution of household 
debt is diverse, the impact of higher unemployment levels generates 
nonhomogeneous effects on debt at risk. The Norwegian and Swedish 
studies propose a simplified analysis assuming that unemployment 
5. Neilson and others (2008) document that labor dynamics is the main factor 
driving entry and exit from income-stressing conditions. In the EFH, labor income 
accounts for more than 60 percent of total households income.
6. There are only estimates of unemployment duration.307 Household Financial Vulnerability
shocks affect all individuals in the same manner. Although limited, 
that methodology makes sense for them because the distribution of 
debt in those countries is much flatter than in Chile (particularly in 
Norway), and also because they have large unemployment benefits 
that cover a substantial part of lost income for a long period. In 
contrast, for Chile it is more appropriate to estimate disaggregated 
job loss probabilities to assess heterogeneous impacts.
2.1 Job Loss Probability
Estimating job loss probabilities requires survival analysis. In this 
case, job loss probability mirrors the probability of staying employed. 
What is estimated, then, is the probability of remaining employed (or 
surviving, in the analysis) at a given moment of time t.
Let T be a nonnegative random variable denoting the time to 
failure (in this case, failure is job loss). The survival function is the 
reverse of the cumulative distribution function of T[F(t)]:
S(t) = 1 -F(t) = Pr(T > t).  (2)
It reports the probability of surviving beyond time t, where the 
density function is simply f(t) = -S'(t).
The cumulative hazard function is defined as 
H(t) = -ln[S(t)],  (3)
such that
f(t) = h(t)exp[-H(t)].  (4)
For the purpose of this paper, what is interesting is how some 
covariates affect the hazard function, which requires multivariate 
analysis. Nevertheless, simpler nonparametric analysis can be 
used to compare different groups’ hazard functions. This is done by 
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where nj is the number of individuals at risk at time tj and dj is the 
number of failures at time tj.
The Cox (1972) semiparametric model requires no parametric 
form of the survival function. It assumes that covariates shift 
multiplicatively the baseline hazard function. For the jth subject, 
the hazard function is:
h t h t j t j t x ( ) ( )exp( ), , , X X = 0 β   (6)
where Xj,t is a vector of variables, and the values of βx are estimated 
from the data. 
The baseline function h0(t) is not parameterized (or even 
estimated), because the model is proposed in terms of ratios 

























The Cox model is rather convenient for the purpose of this paper, 
because it is easy to compute and can provide predicted probabilities 
given the covariates.
Parametric methods require imposing a functional form to 
the baseline hazard function. The most common are the Weibull, 
exponential, lognormal, gamma and log-logistic models. These models 
are computationally costly, and they also have the disadvantage of 
bias in case of an inappropriate distributional assumption.
This papers combines different nonparametric, semiparametric, and 
parametric methods to accurately predict job loss probabilities.
2.2 The Data
The Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protección Social, EPS) 
has been carried out in Chile every two years since 2002. This panel 
survey was designed to assess the well-being of workers and nonworkers 
and their households.7 The EPS includes 16,727 observations, 
representing the population of Chile aged 18 and over in 2004.
7. The EPS was designed jointly by the Ministry of Labor and the Centro de 
Microdatos of the Universidad de Chile, with the close collaboration of the University 
of Pennsylvania.309 Household Financial Vulnerability
In the 2002 wave, the individuals were asked to chronologically 
list every single labor experience since 1980. Each experience 
had a beginning date and an ending date. For each experience, 
the individuals were asked about their employment status, the 
characteristics of the job, and some qualitative questions. In the 2004 
wave, individuals were asked to provide the missing history, that is, 
the experiences that occurred between 2002 and 2004.
The data are then organized into a monthly panel of individuals 
with the corresponding employment information in each period. This 
gives us the employment status of a sample that is representative of 
the Chilean population aged 18 and more in 2004. Representativeness 
in past years narrows to a varying age group. For instance, in 2004 
the data are representative of people between 18 and 65 years old, 
in 2003, between 18 and 64 years old, and so on.
In this paper, we use a ten-year period from 1995 to 2004. This 
period comprises the Asian crisis and a relatively short mild recession 
in 1999 and 2000. Consequently, the unemployment rate rose 
significantly and remained high for a long period afterward. Given 
this timeframe, the sample covers 16,727 individuals over 120 months, 
which implies that the data set has around two million records.
2.3 Estimation Results
We estimate job loss probabilities using the labor experiences 
reported in the 2002 and 2004 EPS. The probabilities incorporate 
a set of individual characteristics, Xjt, and a set of time variant 
aggregate variables, Zjt. The Xjt vector of variables includes gender, 
age, education, job contract, marital status, economic sector of the 
job, and size of the firm. The Zjt vector considers the aggregate 
unemployment rate and monthly activity indexes.
We define job loss as any exit from a job resulting in unemployment 
of inactivity. This definition reflects our objective of assessing 
households’ ability to cope with their financial obligations, since any 
decay in income will increase household financial stress.
To assess survival heterogeneity, we first look at the Kaplan-Meier 
nonparametric estimates of the survival functions. Figure 4 presents 
estimates of the survival function by gender and educational level. 
Men are less likely to lose employment than women at any time: the 
mean estimator indicates that men remain employed 50 percent longer 
than women, and the probability of losing employment reaches 50 
percent only after 80 months for both genders. Workers with tertiary 310 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
Figure 4. Job Loss Probabilities
A. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by gender
B. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by education level
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2002 and 2004 EPS.
education have a much lower probability of losing employment than 
those with primary and secondary education. Workers with secondary 
education have a larger job loss probability than those with primary 
education at shorter employment durations and a lower job loss 
probability after 90 months.
Next,  we  carried  out  multivariate  analysis  for  multiple 
specifications using the Cox semiparametric estimates of the 
proportional hazard model. Table 1 presents our preferred model. 
A series of interesting results emerge from the data. First, the job 
loss probability of men is around 30 percent lower probability than 
women. The unemployment rate shifts that probability by 17 percent, 311 Household Financial Vulnerability







Males = 1  0.333 –15.46 0 0.289
(0.024) (0.382)
Age  0.866 –27.15 0 0.857
(0.005) (0.875)
Age squared 1.001 22.28 0 1.001
(0.000) (1.001)
Unemployment rate  1.121 22.11 0 1.110
(0.006) (1.133)
Unemployment rate *(Males = 1)  1.065 10.23 0 1.052
(0.007) (1.078)
Unemployment rate *(Secondary ed. = 1)  0.961 –22.12 0 0.957
(0.002) (0.964)
Unemployment rate *(Tertiary ed. = 1)  0.977 –5.15 0 0.968
(0.004) (0.986)
Summary statistic
No. subjects  12,906
No. failures  10,907
No. observations  1,295,487
Time at risk  1,301,439
Log likelihood  –99,708.4
LR chi squared (7)  3,661.31
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Coefficients are in exp(β) form. Standard errors are in parentheses.
but it seems to have a much larger effect on men than women (around 
8 percent per unemployment percentage point).
Second, age has a decreasing negative effect on job loss 
probabilities. This means that younger workers are much more likely 
to lose employment at any given time than older workers, but the 
effect fades as age increases.
Third, workers with higher levels of education face a significantly 
lower probability of losing their jobs. Those with tertiary education 
have  about  a  30  percent  lower  probability  than  those  with 312 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
primary education only. The effect of the unemployment rate is 
also heterogeneous among different education groups. Workers 
with tertiary education have a 5 percent lower probability per 
unemployment percentage point (implying about 45 percent lower 
probability, on average) than those with primary education only. 
Workers with secondary education face a 3 percent lower probability 
per unemployment percentage point (implying about 27 percent lower 
probability on average) than those with primary education only.
From the Cox estimates, we can predict job loss probabilities 
through the survival functions. Figures 5 and 6 show the survival 
function estimates for women and men, respectively. Age was set at 
mean values (around 41 years old), and unemployment shifts were set 
at 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20 percent. It is clear from the graphs that 
higher educational attainment diminishes job loss probabilities and, 
more importantly for our purposes, also diminishes the impact of an 
aggregate unemployment shift. Women exhibit higher probabilities of 
job loss (the survival functions are lower), but aggregate unemployment 
shifts affect men considerably more than women.Figure 5. Job Loss Probabilities for Women, by Education 
level
A. Survival function: Women with primary education
B. Survival function: Women with secondary education
C. Survival function: Women with tertiary education
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2002 and 2004 EPS.Figure 6. Job Loss Probabilities for Men, by Education level
A. Survival function: Men with primary education
B. Survival function: Men with secondary education
C. Survival function: Men with tertiary education
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2002 and 2004 EPS.315 Household Financial Vulnerability
3. finanCial sTRess simulaTion
This section is devoted to the analysis of higher unemployment 
rates simulations and their effects on debt at risk. We ran Monte Carlo 
simulations on the probability of losing employment for each of the 
worker individuals in each household. We then imputed the employment 
loss probabilities determined earlier to the EFH data set.
The first problem for this exercise is that the EFH does not 
contain information about employment duration. Employment loss 
probabilities depend critically on the duration of the job, so we had 
to impute employment duration. To do so, we separated workers 
into cells by age group and educational attainment. For each cell, 
the whole distribution of employment duration was computed as  ˆ dc. 
Then, every worker j in cell c was assigned a random employment 
duration following the actual distribution   d d c c ~ ˆ . Hence, this is the 
first source of randomization.8
We then ran the simulations as follows. First, we assigned a 
uniform random number ujh to each worker in the EFH. For each 
worker in the EFH with an assigned employment duration   dc with 
characteristics Xjh and under the scenario given by Zt, we computed 
a job loss probability using the estimated parameters from the 
hazard function. If that probability is below the threshold given by 
the random number, the worker is considered to be employed. If not, 
the worker is considered to have lost his or her employment, so labor 
income in this case becomes zero.







t t = × > 


 1 X Z   (8)
The second source of randomization comes from the fact that the 
simulated employment loss probability contains the uncertainty 
with respect to the survival model estimate through the probability 
of losing the job.
After the worker’s employment condition of the worker is redefined 
and the corresponding labor income recomputed, overall household 
income is computed again. The DSR must also be refreshed to reflect 
the simulated total household income. Finally, aggregate indicators 
of debt at risk are computed again for the whole sample.
8. For the simulations, the actual cumulative density function,  Φ ˆ dc, was 
approximated by a nine-degree polynomial. Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix show 
those estimates.316 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
In the baseline scenario, 61 percent of total households hold 
some sort of formal debt. Specifically, 16 percent of households hold 
secure debt, and 57 percent hold unsecured debt. Secure debt is 60 
percent of total debt (unsecured debt is 40 percent). Moreover, 45 
percent of total debt is held by the upper richest quintile (51 percent 
of secure debt and 36 percent of unsecured debt). The median DSR 
is 19.5 percent for all indebted households.
Table 2 presents the results of the simulations.9 In the baseline 
scenario, with the DSR above 75 percent and the negative margin 
above 20 percent, 9.5 percent of households are considered to have 
debt at risk. Those households accounts for 16.1 percent of total 
household debt.
We then use the underlying job loss probabilities to expand the 
current debt at risk to include households whose members could 
lose their jobs at any moment, thus falling into higher financial 
stress. This raises the number of households under financial stress 
to between 13 percent and 16 percent, while total debt at risk 
increases to between 20 percent and 25 percent, with a 95 percent 
confidence interval.10 
Next, we increase the unemployment rate by 5 percent. This 
is a larger increase than occurred during the Asian crisis. Under 
this scenario, the number of households under high financial 
stress increases to between 16 percent and 19 percent, and debt 
at risk rises to between 22 percent and 28 percent. A 15 percent 
increase in unemployment increases the number of highly stressed 
households to between 25 percent and 28 percent, and debt at risk 
to between 31 percent and 38 percent. These results indicate that 
significant increases in the aggregate unemployment rate do not 
necessarily imply a significant increase in debt at risk relative to 
the current situation. 
These results imply that higher levels of unemployment, 
similar to what was observed during the Asian crisis, do not 
necessarily generate a significant household default shock in 
the financial system. In this scenario, debt at risk only increases 
around 4 percentage points (compared with the baseline scenario 
including underlying job loss probabilities). Nevertheless, this 
9. We used 500 Monte Carlo simulations. Exercises with 1,000 and 5,000 
simulations did not produce significantly different results.
10. We built the 95 percent confidence intervals nonparametrically using simulation 
percentiles.317 Household Financial Vulnerability
Table 2. Households with a Negative Margin
Scenario  








DSR > 50  13.6 17.1 26.1 20.2
DSR > 75  9.5 14.5 18.8 16.1
Baseline scenario 
+ underlying job loss probability
DSR > 50  18.2 – 20.8 20.3 – 26.3 30.8 – 36.5 24.3 – 29.4
DSR > 75  13.2 – 15.6 17.1 – 22.6 23.1 – 29.0 19.7 – 24.6
Delta+ 5% unemployment
DSR > 50  21.5 – 24.4 22.9 – 30.2 34.1 – 40.4 27.1 – 33.0
DSR > 75  15.9 – 18.8 19.2 – 26.2 26.2 – 33.3 22.3 – 28.1
Delta+ 10% unemployment
DSR > 50  26.1 – 29.5 26.7 – 35.3 38.7 – 45.6 31.2 – 38.3
DSR > 75  20.1 – 23.3 22.8 – 30.2 30.9 – 38.8 25.9 – 32.6
Delta+ 15% unemployment
DSR > 50  31.0 – 34.6 31.9 – 40.9 44.3 – 51.4 36.6 – 44.3
DSR > 75  24.5 – 28.0 27.0 – 35.3 36.4 – 44.3 31.0 – 37.9
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. The intervals for the simulations are p(2.5) to p(97.5), and are given in percent.
does not mean that the financial system can overlook household 
debt. Table 2 suggests that for a one-percentage-point increase in 
the unemployment rate, debt at risk expands between 0.6 and 0.8 
percentage points.11
The DSR threshold of 75 percent is not very demanding for 
considering a household under high financial stress. Table 2 includes 
a 50 percent threshold, and figure 7 complements the analysis by 
presenting a range of DSR thresholds under an unemployment shift 
of 5 percent and with the negative margin at 1.2. The results are 
fairly stable, with no extreme shifts in debt at risk.12
11. Jappelli, Pagano, and di Maggio (2008) study a sample of eleven member 
countries of the European Union. They estimate 0.37 percentage points increase in 
arrears for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.
12. Figure A4 in the appendix presents the exercise with a negative margin of 1.1.318 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
Figure 7. Debt at Risk Simulations at Different DSR 
Thresholdsa
A. Households with debt at risk B. Secured debt at risk
C. Unsecured debt at risk D. Total debt at risk
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Unemployment shift of 5 percent and a negative margin of 1.2.
We also look at the distribution of the effects by income 
quintiles. Figure 8 presents the baseline scenario plus the extreme 
scenarios (percentiles 2.5 and 97.5) under a 5 percent increase in 
the aggregate unemployment rate. When unemployment increases, 
debt at risk will only increase significantly if the households in 
the high income quintiles are affected. Our estimates of the job 
loss probabilities indicate that this is fairly unlikely under all 
circumstances. However, the bottom line is that high-income, high-
debt households should be monitored.Figure 8. Debt at Risk Simulations by Income Quintile
A. Baseline scenario
B. Scenario: 5 percent increase in unemployment, p(2.5)
C. Scenario: 5 percent increase in unemployment, p(97.5)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2002 and 2004 EPS.320 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
Finally, several issues are not considered in this simulation 
exercise. First, as workers face nonnegative unemployment 
probabilities, unemployed (and inactive) workers face a nonnegative 
probability of becoming employed and then being able to contribute 
labor income to household financial resources. Second, workers 
who lose their jobs may have unemployment insurance, although 
in Chile this does not imply a significant source of income.13 Third, 
workers who retire to inactivity may have pension income. Fourth, 
households that experience unemployment may use other sources 
of income to face their financial obligations, making default less 
likely to occur. Fifth, households that experience unemployment 
may sell assets in order to avoid default. Finally, since household-
level default data are not available, the increase in debt at risk after 
a shock should be interpreted as household debt that could come 
under financial strain, rather than an increase in nonperforming 
loans. All these caveats go in the same direction, which is to make 
this simulation exercise less stressing for households’ financial 
situation. Consequently, this exercise should be considered as an 
upper bound that is unlikely to occur.
4. ConClusions
The indebtedness of the household sector has  increased 
significantly in recent years in Chile. However, no analysis had been 
carried out previously to assess how vulnerable households could be 
in terms of their financial stress under aggregate unemployment 
shifts. This paper contributes with a novel analysis aimed at 
quantifying the associated risks for financial stability.
Households display significant heterogeneity in terms of the 
fragility of their main income source, labor income, implying that 
microeconomic studies must be used to assess aggregate impacts of 
unemployment on financial stress. Gender, age, and education are the 
key factors that determine the size of the impact of unemployment 
shocks on the probability of losing a job.
We  find  that  for  a  one-percentage-point  increase  in  the 
unemployment rate, debt at risk increases between 0.6 and 0.8 
percentage points. However, because household debt is concentrated 
in high income households, heterogeneous responses to unemployment 
may have important implications for financial stability. In fact, the 
13. Unemployment insurance covers 30 percent of earnings for three months for 
a worker who has been employed at least 40 consecutive months.321 Household Financial Vulnerability
simulations carried out on the different shock scenarios show that 
debt at risk is rather bounded.
Higher levels of unemployment do not necessarily generate 
a significant household default shock in the financial system. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the financial system can 
overlook household debt.322 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
aPPendix
Supplemental Figures
Figure A1. Distribution of Chilean Household Indebtedness 
by Income Quintile
A. Based on the 2004 EPS
B. Based on the 2006 CASEN
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the 2004 EPS and the 2006 CASEN.Figure A2. Employment Duration Distribution for Women 
A. Women aged 18–24 B. Women aged 25–34
C. Women aged 35–44 D. Women aged 45–54
E. Women aged 55–65
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2002 and 2004 EPS.Figure A3. Employment Duration Distribution for Men 
A. Men aged 18–24 B. Men aged 25–34
C. Men aged 35–44 D. Men aged 45–54
E. Men aged 55–65
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2002 and 2004 EPS.Figure A4. Debt at Risk Simulations at Different DSR 
Thresholdsa
A. Households with debt at risk B. Secured debt at risk
C. Unsecured debt at risk D. Total debt at risk
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2002 and 2004 EPS.
a. Unemployment shift of 5 percent and a negative margin of 1.1.326 Marcelo Fuenzalida and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle
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